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Comment: Knowledge Circles and the 
Duty of Care 
Jill M. Fraley* 
There are significant reasons for pursuing solutions that are 
flexible and nuanced in the context of second-hand asbestos 
exposure. Those reasons center on history and geography—the 
history of asbestos manufacture and product use within the 
United States and the geography of both asbestos use and 
asbestos-related tort claims. 
In her Note, Ms. Flinn discusses the development of three 
distinct strands of state tort law addressing the potential duty of 
care that an employer might owe an employee’s family member 
who was exposed to asbestos.1 The three distinct approaches 
center around first, foreseeability of the danger and harm;2 
second, the relationship between the claimant and the employer;3 
and third, the misfeasance or nonfeasance approach, which 
focuses on whether the relevant behavior is an act or omission.4 
Ms. Flinn addresses advantages and drawbacks of each of these 
positions and indicates whether these approaches tend to favor 
plaintiffs or defendants in tort litigation.  
The Note then turns to evaluating two important recent 
developments in the field: the failed history of attempted federal 
legislative solutions5 and the novel approach of the Third 
Restatement,6 which creates a presumption of a duty where there 
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 1. See generally Meghan E. Flinn, Note, A Continuing War with Asbestos: 
The Stalemate Among State Courts on Liability for Take-Home Asbestos 
Exposure, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV 707 (2014).  
 2. Id. at 714–19. 
 3. Id. at 719–24. 
 4. Id. at 724–28. 
 5. See id. at 751–53 (discussing Congress’s attempts to initiate asbestos 
litigation). 
 6. Id. at 728–30. 
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is a risk of physical harm, but allows that presumption to be 
outweighed by articulated policy considerations.7 Ultimately Ms. 
Flinn rejects both pursuing federal legislative solutions and the 
approach of the Third Restatement.8 She encourages a “multi-
factored test” approach that would consider each of the tort 
factors traditionally relevant to an analysis of duty—including 
both the foreseeability of the harm and the relationship between 
the parties—while also incorporating the Restatement’s public 
policy approach to duty.9  
 Significantly, the Note recognizes that state tort law 
diverges when weighting these and other factors in the duty 
analysis, with some states relying heavily on foreseeability and 
others weighting the factors more evenly.10 Ms. Flinn encourages 
states to continue to use each of the factors, weighting them 
according to their own historical practice.11 Additionally, she 
argues that the state legislatures rather than the federal should 
take on the task of considering appropriate legislation that would 
weight policy considerations raised by second-hand exposure 
cases.12 
In this Comment, I want to take the opportunity to explain 
some additional support for the Note’s approach, which rejects 
what many have sought in terms of national consistency within 
this line of cases. My observations on these topics come from 
direct experience—through a few years of litigating products 
liability claims that included not only premises-based asbestos 
exposure claims but also second-hand exposure cases. In 
litigating those cases, I applied my training as a legal historian to 
the review of hundreds of boxes of client documents dating to the 
early half of the twentieth century along with summaries of 
                                                                                                     
 7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (2010) 
(making an exception to the duty of reasonable care only where an “articulated 
countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability”). 
 8. See Flinn, supra note 1, at 745 (rejecting the Third Restatement and 
proposing other solutions).  
 9. Id. at 746–51. 
 10. See id. at 745 (recognizing the different ways that state courts weigh 
the various factors relevant to take-home asbestos cases).  
 11. See id. at 750 (“[T]he multi-factored test gives each court the flexibility 
to implement its state’s common law on torts and to adhere to its precedent.”).  
 12. See id. at 755 (asserting that “individual state statutory responses most 
effectively address the problem of take-home asbestos exposure”).  
COMMENT: KNOWLEDGE CIRCLES 791 
research from numerous other cases and industries. In the 
following, I offer a few reflections about the complexity of the 
historical story, based on my own exposure to pending cases. 
As the Note explains, one of the differences between the 
Third Restatement’s approach and the foreseeability approach is 
that the former makes duty a question of law, while the latter 
approaches duty through a question of fact.13 The foreseeability 
approach, which is arguably also inherent in many policy 
considerations for second-hand asbestos exposure claims,14 
immediately generates historical questions. Who knew that 
asbestos was lethal enough to cause harm to an employee’s family 
members when carried home on clothing? When was that 
knowledge common or expected? 
Unfortunately, in seeking simple, comprehensive, and 
national answers to those questions, courts often speak of the 
knowledge of “the asbestos industry,”15 a phrase too historically 
broad to generate very accurate conclusions. As a naturally 
occurring mineral substance with extraordinary physical 
properties in terms of thermal capacities and the manipulability 
of mineral fibers that rivaled fabrics, asbestos permeated 
industrial work within the United States for decades.16 Asbestos 
use spanned major industries beginning with the mining industry 
responsible for obtaining raw asbestos, and then including the 
production of building materials as diverse as shingles, siding, 
flooring, wiring, heating systems, and insulation, but also other 
major American industries including the manufacture of 
electronics from radios to household irons, automobile production, 
and numerous national-defense-related industries.17  
                                                                                                     
 13. See id. at 731–32 (explaining the Third Restatement’s position). 
 14. See id. at 737–38 (proposing a link between foreseeability and public 
policy). 
 15. See, e.g., Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 445 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (“There has been no showing of any general knowledge of bystander 
exposure in the industry. Indeed, other courts have found there was no 
knowledge of bystander exposure in the asbestos industry in the 1950’s.”). 
 16. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST. (May 1, 
2009), http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2014) (describing the nature and use of asbestos) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 17. See id. (discussing the use of asbestos in the United States and those 
industries that pose a high risk for asbestos exposure).  
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It is nearly impossible to make a coherent and accurate 
statement about the state of knowledge of asbestos toxicity within 
“the asbestos industry” because asbestos was a part of so many 
diverse industries that would have had differing rates of 
asbestos-related illnesses depending on the rate and method of 
exposures. Automobile brake linings, for instance, contained 
comparatively far less asbestos than insulation products.18 In 
short, there is every reason to expect that knowledge of asbestos 
toxicity—and particularly the toxicity of attenuated second-hand 
exposure—was uneven both geographically and temporally.  
While some information may be inferred from the publication 
of peer-reviewed studies in national journals,19 for decades 
experts continued to disagree about facts that were important to 
understanding causation.20 Many plaintiffs alleged exposure 
through multiple employments in multiple industries, thereby 
making it even more difficult for medical experts to pinpoint 
toxicity levels.21 Notably, one of the reasons the lethal toxicity of 
asbestos remained poorly understood for some time was the 
comparatively long latency period that exists for mesothelioma, 
which often develops fifteen to twenty-five years after exposure, 
but then becomes nearly immediately fatal.22 Most importantly, 
experts disagreed significantly about the level of exposure that 
was necessary to put a person at risk23—an issue that would be 
particularly relevant to determining whether an individual 
                                                                                                     
 18. See id. (explaining asbestos levels of exposure in various industries). 
 19. See, e.g., Ellen P. Donovan et al., Evaluation of Take Home (Para-
Occupational) Exposure to Asbestos and Disease: A Review of the Literature, in 
42 CRITICAL REVIEWS IN TOXICOLOGY 703, 703–31 (Roger McClellan ed., 2012) 
(describing how and when the risks of take-home asbestos came to be 
understood). 
 20. See Flinn, supra note 1, at 743 n.226 (explaining that experts have 
fundamental disagreements about the evolution of the asbestos crisis).  
 21. See, e.g., Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 442 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (explaining that the plaintiff brought suits against General Motors 
and Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. because her husband came into contact with 
asbestos while he worked for each of the companies). The plaintiff alleged that 
her husband’s exposure at either job could have caused her asbestos-related 
illness. Id. 
 22. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., ELIMINATION OF ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASES 
1 (2006) (explaining the latent effects of asbestos exposure). 
 23. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 16 (discussing 
whether a “safe” level of asbestos exists). 
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corporation knew or should have known that any harm was likely 
to befall the family of an employee based solely on brief exposure 
to the employee’s clothing.  
None of this is said to defend the corporations, some of whom 
seem to have knowingly caused harm to the American public as 
well as their own employees. The point, rather, is to acknowledge 
that determining foreseeability for any individual corporation is a 
complex historical question.  
Moreover, it is also a geographical question. Knowledge of 
asbestos toxicity not only spread more quickly through some 
industries than others, but it spread geographically throughout 
the country unevenly depending on the saturation of asbestos-
using industries and asbestos-containing products.24 As a broad 
generalization, because of its insulation properties, asbestos use 
was more common within New England than in the South, which 
faces fewer negative temperatures. As a result, in a time long 
before electronic communication, a company in Delaware or 
Pennsylvania had a greater likelihood of encountering expert 
knowledge on the toxicity level of asbestos than a company in 
Florida. Knowledge bases about toxicity are likely to parallel the 
geographical distribution of manufacture and production, as well 
as product distribution. 
Similarly, because there is a geography to the history of 
asbestos mining and industrial use, there is also a geography to 
the resulting tort litigation. As the Note explains, some courts are 
greatly burdened by asbestos-related claims, while others only 
rarely encounter them.25  
Returning to the issue of foreseeability, I would postulate 
that the concept is so significant for many states in determining 
whether there is a duty—and also so often pulled into policy 
discussions—because foreseeability is inherently tied to our sense 
of fairness. We want to hold liable those companies that knew 
and did nothing to protect citizens (whether employees or not) 
                                                                                                     
 24. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., WORK-RELATED LUNG DISEASE SURVEILLANCE REPORT 159 fig.7-2 
(2003) (illustrating the dispersion of mesothelioma cases throughout the United 
States and demonstrating that the northern states have the highest mortality 
rate). 
 25. See Flinn, supra note 1, at 755 (discussing the differing concentrations 
of asbestos litigation throughout the nation).  
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who did not know of the danger. I would further argue that if we 
want to approach foreseeability in secondhand asbestos litigation 
fairly, then we need to do so in the way that Ms. Flinn has argued 
within this Note—through flexible mechanisms that maintain 
state autonomy and continue to emphasize foreseeability as a key 
factor in determining whether there is a duty of care.26 Similarly, 
state legislatures are better positioned than the federal 
government to craft statutory responses that will be narrowly 
tied to the industrial history of each area of the country.27 In 
some states, the prevalence of certain industries or milestone 
publications on toxicity may well be sufficient to make desirable a 
statute that would postulate a certain level of foreseeability, 
thereby replacing fact-intensive judicial proceedings.28  
A quest for national uniformity or comprehensiveness in an 
approach to addressing second-hand asbestos claims would 
necessarily rely on generalities that would subsume the historical 
and geographical nuances of both industries and knowledge 
transfer. A more flexible approach, and one that seeks state 
legislative solutions, better fits the history and geography of the 
social problem at hand. 
                                                                                                     
 26. See id. at 750 (suggesting a flexible approach to take-home asbestos 
litigation). 
 27. See id. at 755–56 (encouraging state legislatures to draft litigation that 
corresponds with the state’s history with asbestos).  
 28. See id. at 754 (mentioning Ohio’s ban on take-home asbestos claims as 
a possible statutory approach). 
